

C.I.A.

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**Q** How many wars, overt and covert, has our Central Intelligence Agency conducted for us since it was founded in 1947, and how many has it won?—J.L., Libertyville, Ill.

**A** The CIA has participated in wars or revolts in Cuba, the Congo, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Albania, Guatemala, Angola, Tibet, Chile, Lithuania, Latvia, the Ukraine, Nicaragua and El Salvador. At times, it was victorious in the Congo, Iran, Guatemala and Chile. A pertinent book on the subject is "The Man Who Kept the Secrets—Richard Helms and the CIA," by Thomas Powers.

Tom Wicker

# A new push for nuclear test ban

**N**EW YORK — Thirty-nine years ago this week, on Aug. 6, 1945, the Enola Gay opened its bomb bay doors over Hiroshima and the United States became the first and only nation to use nuclear weapons against another. On this somber anniversary, a public campaign is being launched to achieve an end to all nuclear explosions by the time of Hiroshima's 40th observance in 1985.

Such a campaign is not as far-fetched as it may sound. Once before, beginning in the Eisenhower administration, a moratorium on all nuclear testing was observed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Twice before, in the Kennedy and Carter administrations, a comprehensive test-ban treaty was nearly achieved.

The Kennedy effort ended in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. The Carter negotiations were virtually complete, with the Russians agreeing to on-site inspections for verification, when Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan and the resistance of the U.S. military and the national nuclear laboratories scuttled the treaty.

Then Ronald Reagan took office and began a nuclear buildup that caused him to renounce any intention of negotiating a test ban. Reagan therefore gave the back of his hand to the legal treaty commitments his predecessors had undertaken.

In the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and later in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, both ratified by the Senate, the United States had solemnly pledged its best efforts to bring about an end to nuclear testing.

Renewed nuclear proliferation is one good reason to bring public pressures on Reagan, if he should be re-elected, to seek a comprehensive test ban. At their last review conference in 1980, signatory nations of the non-proliferation treaty warned that if the nuclear powers did not make progress toward ending nuclear tests by the time of their next conference in 1985, some might withdraw from the treaty and resume nuclear weapons development. But the only thing that's been done about nuclear tests has been to conduct more of them here in the United States and in the Soviet Union.

Nonproliferation is only one reason. Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg of the University of California, who was the head of the Atomic Energy Commission under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, observed in a statement supporting the new drive for a comprehensive test-ban treaty that such a treaty would "halt that aspect of the arms race that is most threatening, the qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons."

A relatively simple step to take and enforce

a comprehensive test ban, as Seaborg points out, would also produce "new momentum" in more complex arms-control negotiations. And such a treaty might open the way for improved Soviet-American relations across the board.

Seaborg prepared his remarks for a Washington news conference on Aug. 6 to announce a new comprehensive test ban campaign by the Center for Defense Information, which hopes to generate worldwide support. W. Averell Harriman, the American negotiator for the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and numerous scientists and scientific organizations are also expected to register their backing.

Walter Mondale, the Democratic presidential nominee, announced in the spring that if elected he would observe a moratorium on nuclear testing as long as Moscow did as a step toward renewing negotiations for a comprehensive test ban.

The predictable opposition will center, first, on the supposed difficulties of verification. But aside from the Soviet Union's stated willingness to accept on-site inspection, the scientific evidence is overwhelming that nuclear tests above one kiloton in magnitude (smaller explosions have little value for weapons development) can be detected by seismic means.

Opponents will also argue, as before, that testing is necessary to keep weapons in the nuclear stockpile in working order. In fact, "meticulous inspection and disassembly" have been the main reliance for such checkups, a former director of the Los Alamos laboratory has testified.

These spurious arguments have prevailed in the past. But the real reason for testing is to develop and improve nuclear weapons, and the best reason for a comprehensive test ban is to put a stop to that — here, in the Soviet Union and anywhere else it might be contemplated.

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Tom Wicker is a syndicated columnist.

# Nicaraguan rebels using CIA warfare manual

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — The CIA produced a psychological warfare manual for Nicaraguan rebels that instructs them to hire professional criminals for "selective jobs" and says some government officials can be "neutralized" with the "selective use of violence," intelligence sources say.

The 90-page manual, written in Spanish, also urges the rebels to create a "martyr" by arranging a violent demonstration that leads to the death of one of their supporters, and it tells how to coerce Nicaraguans into carrying out assignments against their will.

A photostatic copy of the book was obtained by The Associated Press. Its authenticity and the CIA's role in its production were confirmed independently by U.S. intelligence sources, who insisted on anonymity.

Produced by the CIA about a year ago, the manual titled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War," was distributed inside the Honduran-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force, which is known by its Spanish initials FDN, the sources said.

FDN President Adolfo Calero, whose group is the largest rebel faction, said that he first saw the manual less than a year ago and that it was given only to "our top people." He denied that the CIA produced it, claiming it was a contribution from a supporter whose name he could not recall. He said the author's name on the cover — "Tayacan" — is a pen-name that means "head man."

Calero said that while the manual presents "some applicable ideas, it also contains some things ... we would not accept and we do not practice. It talks about terrorism, which is something we haven't done."

CIA spokesman George Lauder refused comment on the manual.

The manual stresses the need for political propaganda in a guerrilla war and most of it deals with routine instructions on how to conduct psychological operations designed to turn the people against the government.

"Guerrilla war is essentially a political war," the book's preface says. "This book is a manual for training guerrillas in psychological operations and their application in the concrete case of the Christian and democratic crusade in which the freedom commandos are engaged in Nicaragua."

It also counsels the rebels not to use "explicit terror" against civilians because that could cost support. It says the rebels should "demonstrate good conduct" while dealing with the public.

But the manual endorses the "selective use of violence" against Nicaraguan judges, police and security officials. It says such people can be "neutralized," but that the targets should be selected carefully based on their unpopularity with the people and the "level of violence necessary to carry out the change."

"For psychological effect, it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is essential to assemble the townspeople so they gather, take part in the activity and formulate accusations against the oppressor," the manual says.

The book does not use the words "assassinate" or "kill," although references to "danger to other individuals in the area of the target" and to assessing likely replacements suggest that the goal is to remove the officials physically.

An executive order signed by President Reagan on Dec. 4, 1981 said no U.S. government employee "shall engage in or con-

spire to engage in assassination" and adds that no intelligence agency "shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order."

The manual says: "If possible, professional criminals should be hired to carry out specific, selec-

tive jobs." The precise nature of those jobs is not explained.

The manual says "specific jobs should be assigned to other elements, with the goal of creating a 'martyr' for the cause."

The rebels are advised to lead "demonstrators into clashes with the authorities, to provoke riots

or shootings, which lead to the killing of one or more persons, who will be seen as the martyrs; this situation should be taken advantage of immediately against the government to create even bigger conflicts."

The manual also instructs the rebels how to coerce Nicaraguans into carrying out assignments against their will. The rebels are told to draw a person into meetings with rebel leaders without him knowing their identities and then threaten to expose him to police "if he fails to cooperate."

The rebels are told that if they shoot a citizen trying to flee, the village should be informed that the person was "an enemy of the people" who would have alerted the Sandinistas — prompting

government troops to "carry out reprisals such as rape, pillage, destruction, kidnapping and so forth."

One source familiar with the book said the CIA sent the manual to the FDN at about the same time the agency supplied a comic book-style booklet instructing Nicaraguans how to sabotage their government.

That booklet, distributed in northern Nicaragua and also obtained by the AP, urged Nicaraguans to call in sick to work, pour sand into engines, clog toilets and hurl firebombs at police offices and fuel depots. Only 1,000 to 2,000 copies were distributed, the source said.

In July, Brian Barger, correspondent for the Pacific News

Service, quoted FDN propaganda chief Edgar Chamorro as saying the sabotage and psychological warfare manuals were provided by CIA advisers late last year and modified slightly to make them "look Nicaraguan."

Reagan, who has accused the Sandinistas of aiding Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador, authorized the Nicaraguan covert action in December 1981.

Since then, the CIA reportedly has funneled about \$80 million to the anti-Sandinista rebels.

But after disclosures in April that the CIA directed the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, Congress refused to provide more money for guerrilla operations until Feb. 28, and then only if both the full House and Senate approve.

*The manual stresses the need for political propaganda and provides routine instructions on how to conduct psychological operations designed to turn the people against the government.*

## NONFICTION

**ENIGMA: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two.** By Wladyslaw Kozaczuk. Edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek. (University Publications of America, \$24.) "Enigma," a volume in its publisher's "Foreign Intelligence Book Series," tells the story of how the Nazi cipher machine — Enigma — was cracked by a team of young Polish mathematicians turned cryptologists. The book is as much a tribute to their cleverness as it is an account of Nazi arrogance. The Germans were so certain of Enigma's impregnability that they used it throughout the war. To crack its secrets, the Polish cryptologists relied not only on their fluent command of mathematics and the German language but also on their familiarity with German customs, culture and mentality. Adding invention to ingenuity, the Poles built replicas of the unseen cipher machine as early as 1933 and passed them on to French and British intelligence. In addition to telling the story of Enigma, Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, a Polish historian, provides disturbing examples of Allied generals who possessed detailed accounts of enemy intentions but were unable or unwilling to take adequate countermeasures. While illustrating that military intelligence was indispensable to the war effort, he makes the point that knowing the enemy's strength and strategy is not always enough to insure a quick and decisive victory.

— M. S. Kaplan

### The Kennedys and Castro

To the Editor:

Robert Manning's review of "The Right Hand of Power" by U. Alexis Johnson (Sept. 23) is a curious one. Mr. Manning devotes nearly half his review to what he calls a "surprising, even disturbing" "interlude." He refers to Mr. Johnson's clear

denial that the special group set up by President John F. Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, ever discussed assassinating Fidel Castro. Mr. Manning seems troubled by this statement and suggests either that Mr. Johnson has not read what he calls "the disclosures from hearings before Sen. Frank Church's Select Committee on Intelligence" as well as "other inquiries into the government's efforts to rid this planet of Fidel Castro." He even goes so far as to suggest that Mr. Johnson is discreetly hiding information from his readers as the good soldier Mr. Manning assumes him to be.

But the hearings before Senator Church's committee, as well as the "other inquiries," all made it abundantly clear that neither President Kennedy nor Attorney General Kennedy ever authorized any assassination attempts against Castro. In fact, the Church committee heard explicit testimony from the C.I.A. that when Robert Kennedy first discovered the Mafia-connected assassination attempts that had begun in the Eisenhower Administration, he became extremely angry and ordered them halted.

It is good to have Mr. Johnson's firsthand testimony that in all of the inside discussion during that period, when the Kennedy Administration's concern with Cuba and Castro was high, there was indeed no discussion of assassination.

FRANK MANKIEWICZ  
Washington

Joseph Kraft

# The CIA is in hot water once again

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency is going into the public pillory again. But this time nobody can blame those favorite whipping boys — the liberals of the 1970s.

This time the blame falls squarely on the CIA and its present director, William Casey. Under his tutelage, the agency has misled the White House and the Congress, thus shattering the base of bipartisan support for intelligence activities.

The agency originally came into bad odor in the wake of Watergate and the Vietnam war. Investigation by a Senate committee headed by the late Frank Church of Idaho showed that the CIA had a hand in all kinds of dirty operations, including attempted assassinations.

In that period, those who tried to defend the agency as a valuable national resource could at least argue that the temper of the times was sour. Unfortunately, Jimmy Carter made one of his worst appointments in naming Admiral Stansfield Turner to be director of Central Intelligence. Turner very early began a feud which he is still indulging with the "old boy" network of CIA veterans.

But there were figures in the Congress, particularly among defense-minded Democrats, who saw the need to rebuild. They worked behind the scenes to make more money available to the agency and to restore morale. A good example is Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, the New York Democrat, who has been serving as vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"When I came in," Moynihan recalled recently, "I asked myself whether we shouldn't scrap the CIA and start over again. The officers who came up here looked so damaged. They couldn't think on their feet. They couldn't play checkers, let alone chess. They were good people who had been hurt. But of course we couldn't close it down. So we tried healing. We gave them money and told them they were first rate. And there were signs of progress."

The progress halted with the appointment of Casey as director in 1981, and the onset of

covert operations in Nicaragua. Casey would have been an embarrassment to any bureau of government. Before becoming director, he was mixed up in charges of plagiarism and hip deep in Watergate. At the agency, he was involved in smelly stock transactions, dubious testimony on the Carter briefing book and association with shabby characters. A former Republican secretary of state, trying to defend Casey, could only say, "He's not as sleazy as he looks."

As to Nicaragua, the right-wing dictatorship of the Somozas was ousted in 1979. The successor regime, democratic at first, quickly yielded to a group called the Sandinistas, with

ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and a background in Marxism-Leninism. The United States undertook to harass the Sandinistas by supporting against them a guerrilla force known as the contras.

"From the first it didn't feel right," Moynihan said of the CIA operation against the Sandinistas. "You knew you were dealing with one part of the agency, not the whole. Some of their briefings about their plans came close to fantasizing. Then they began to hide things."

One operation hidden from the Senate committee was the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. When events disclosed the fact, Barry Goldwater, the committee chairman, fired off an angry message to Casey. Moynihan tried unsuccessfully to find out what had happened. Then, on April 12, 1984, President Reagan's National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane told a conference at Annapolis that "every important detail" of the mining had been "shared in full" with the congressional committee.

As a protest against being called a liar in public, Moynihan resigned as vice chairman. Casey, prodded by the White House, made a public apology to the committee. Moynihan claims that McFarlane told him that in reporting to the White House, the CIA had been "either disingenuous or outright wrong." A second case of "hiding" now surfaces with the manual written by a contract employee of the CIA which advised the contras to "neutralize," or assassinate, Sandinista officials. The Senate committee was not told of that manual which sanctioned terrorism and violated a presidential order.



Obviously something is very wrong. Congressional support for the agency is now almost nil. Moynihan says of Casey and the agency, "It breaks my heart. We need an intelligence capacity. But they're hurting themselves and they don't know it. They still don't understand they are damaging the president, not helping him."

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*Joseph Kraft is a syndicated columnist.*

## Stage set for U.S. to increase military role in Third World

By FRED HIATT  
The Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The Reagan administration is systematically laying the foundation within the Pentagon for increasing military involvement in Third World conflicts, according to budget documents and interviews with current and former officials.

Once again, the Defense Department is beefing up its Green Berets and other "special forces," troops trained to kill guerrillas and to teach other armies to do the same.

The increased U.S. role in what the Pentagon calls "counterinsurgency," which has been advocated since 1982 in classified defense documents, also is reflected in the types of ships and weapons being purchased, the network of overseas bases being formed, the increase in U.S. military training overseas, the administration's legislative proposals to lift restrictions on such training and the record U.S. share in the Third World arms market.

Fueling the new emphasis is the Reagan administration's conviction

that President Jimmy Carter concentrated too heavily on European and South Korean defense while neglecting what one former top official called "the nibbling and erosion at the edges." Fred C. Ikle, undersecretary of defense for policy, said in a recent interview that the Reagan administration took office amid "growing concern in this country with the spread of the communist empire into various outposts."

Top officials agreed that their policies echo those of the Kennedy administration in many ways, but they said they have placed more emphasis on training others to resist guerrilla movements than on using U.S. forces.

But if U.S. troops are needed, they said, the lessons of Vietnam will influence the troops' deployment.

"The military, as well as the civilian side, in the administration recognize the importance of having a coherent strategy of first, if at all possible, avoiding the possibility of U.S. combat forces being involved . . . and second,

Turn to Section 1, Page 4

# Sharing the Ordeal of Vietnam

## BLOODS

*An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans.*  
By Wallace Terry.  
Illustrated. 311 pp. New York: Random House, \$17.95.

## PAYBACK

By Joe Klein.  
351 pp. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, \$17.95.

By Stanley Karnow

**M**ORE than a decade has passed since the last United States combat troops left Vietnam, yet the war is still not behind us. It persists in the public's fear of a similarly tragic venture in Central America or elsewhere. It haunts the families and friends of the dead, whose names are inscribed in the eloquent Vietnam Memorial in Washington. It is alive in the memories of the nearly three million young Americans who went through the experience in Southeast Asia. And it is reflected in the growing literature on the war, now reaching massive dimensions. Space prevents me from even beginning to cite my choice of the "best" books, fiction and nonfiction, since so many are first-rate. But I would certainly add these superb contributions to the lengthening shelf.

Wallace Terry, a Time correspondent during the war, has brilliantly edited the recollections of 20 black American soldiers in "Bloods" — the title derived from the label black G.I.'s pinned on themselves. Joe Klein, a writer for New York magazine who was born too late to have been involved in the conflict, has produced in "Payback" an extraordinarily perceptive account of the postwar lives of five Marines. Taken together, the two narratives dramatize what happened to the men in action and how they tried to adjust following their return home. They offer a uniquely human portrayal of the war and its aftermath. It is not a glorious picture.

The impact of the conflict on its participants ought to be seen in balance. Most Americans came back from Vietnam quietly and unobtrusively, to resume the existence they had interrupted. But the war crippled an unusually high percentage of those who fought in it, frequently in ways that are not easily apparent. A Veterans Administration psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Ewald, has reckoned that some 700,000 Vietnam veterans have suffered from various forms of "post-traumatic stress syndrome," the modern term for what was called "shell shock" in World War I and "battle fatigue" in World War II. Its symptoms, which can surface after 10 or 15 years, range from panic and rage to anxiety, depression and emotional paralysis. Crime, suicide, alcoholism, narcotics addiction and divorce among Vietnam veterans far outstrip the norm.

A prime cause of this phenomenon, which continues to be studied, surely lies in the singular nature of the conflict. All wars are ghastly, but Vietnam was espe-

cially horrible. The average age of the G.I.'s sent there was 19, seven years younger than the average for their fathers in World War II, and that made them particularly vulnerable to psychological stress. The rotation system aggravated their problems. Limiting their tours of duty to 12 months may have been merciful, but the soldiers landed alone, often entered units as strangers and rarely developed close ties with their buddies. For many, the solitude of Vietnam was frightening.

Moreover, on patrols through rice fields or jungles, they quickly discovered that their principal threat came from enemy mines, booby traps and sniper fire, which accounted for more United States casualties than direct clashes with the North Vietnamese or Vietcong. Distinguishing friend from foe was another problem. The Vietnamese child who delivered the laundry might be concealing a grenade, and any village could be an enemy stronghold. In this seemingly hostile environment, G.I.'s soon assumed that all Vietnamese were suspect, and their sense of insecurity mounted.

In other wars Americans had gauged progress by conquering ground. But Vietnam was not a war for territory. The American aim was to grind down the enemy until the Communist leadership in Hanoi agreed to abandon its goal of dominating South Vietnam. Gen. William Westmoreland, the American commander,

called it a "strategy of attrition," and its measure of success was the gruesome "body count" of North Vietnamese and Vietcong corpses. Given America's stupendous destructive power, its aircraft, artillery, warships and arsenal of sophisticated technological devices, there was no doubt that the approach would work.

But the Communists were prepared to make enormous sacrifices to achieve their objective. They had advertised their determination as far back as 1946, when Ho Chi Minh warned the French on the eve of their war, "You can kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win." Senior veterans of the Korean War, like Gen. Matthew Ridgway and Gen. James Gavin, understood that the Asian mainland was a quagmire, and they were early critics of the United States commitment to Vietnam. Not until 1971, however, did former Secretary of State Dean Rusk confess that he had "personally underestimated" the ability of the Communists to resist.

So Vietnam was a futile American effort from the start. Nevertheless, American troops were led into the hopeless war by Washington policy makers who had little appreciation of the region's realities — and who, to their eternal discredit, consistently excluded optimism to camouflage their private gloom. The G.I.'s, black and white, were their victims.

Wallace Terry's focus on the experience of the blacks in Vietnam is welcome, since recognition of their role has been long overdue. A disproportionately large number of blacks served there, partly because many saw a military career as upward mobility and partly because many lacked the educational credentials to escape the draft. They also took a disproportionately large number of casualties. But the broader value of Mr. Terry's book is that it demonstrates that blacks and whites in Vietnam, whatever their differences, went through essentially the same ordeal.

Stanley Karnow, the author of "Vietnam: A History," was chief correspondent for the Public Broadcasting System series "Vietnam: A Television History."

## Legislators want more CIA data

By The New York Times

WASHINGTON — The House Select Committee on Intelligence will press for stringent legislation to require the CIA to inform Congress of covert activities, committee leaders said Tuesday.

The House Intelligence Committee staff has recommended a nine-point plan that far exceeds the agreement signed last week between William J. Casey, CIA director, and members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. House committee leaders said they also might seek an agreement that exceeds the Senate-CIA memorandum.

Under current law, the agency is required to keep Congress "fully and currently informed" of "significant anticipated intelligence activities."

According to the staff report, "Clearly, the committee's concept of what is 'significant' has not been shared by key intelligence officials."

The Senate Intelligence Committee complained recently about not being informed of the CIA role in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, and the House Intelligence Committee said the agency had not revealed its role in the Salvadoran elections.

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, D-Ind., said he and Rep. Edward P. Boland, D-Mass., will offer a package of bills to place strict controls on the CIA.

Hamilton, a senior committee member, has been designated by Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., the speaker of the House, to succeed Boland as chairman of the Intelligence Committee after this session.

"You have a certain set of mind in the CIA unlike any other I've encountered in the bureaucracy," Hamilton said.

He said that although the legislation is needed, "the problem is attitudinal, not legal."

"If you have a spirit of consultation and they look upon the Congress as partners and not an adversary," he said, "these problems won't arise."

Boland said he agreed on the need for closer oversight of the CIA and more stringent requirements that Congress be informed of covert operations.

The legislation was first proposed by Rep. Wyche Fowler Jr., D-Ga., who said it had some bipartisan support because experience had shown "that the legal apparatus is inadequate."

Rep. Norman Y. Mineta, D-Calif., who also is a senior member of the committee, said, "It would be very helpful if there were some standardized, stricter reporting requirements placed on the CIA."

The committee staff report, which was classified until Monday, recommends that the CIA notify the committee of activities approved by the president. This recommendation is the crux of the agreement between Casey and the Senate Intelligence Committee.

In addition, the House committee staff recommends the committee be notified on these matters:

— Any transfer of U.S. military equipment that could alter the nature of American relations with the recipient country.

— The use of any means, specifically including, but not limited to, the employment of force, that departs from the scope of a program, putting into effect a covert action.

— Material changes in the objectives of a covert action program.

— The use of U.S. military personnel or equipment, or other non-CIA personnel or equipment in covert actions.

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*O. Manuel Gil*

## Study: CIA not monitored before Vietnam

WASHINGTON (AP) — Congress made "virtually no effort" to check on the CIA's activities in Southeast Asia during the years that led to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, a congressional report said Thursday.

Issuance of the study by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee coincided with a meeting of the Senate Intelligence Committee to tighten its monitoring of the CIA in Central America and elsewhere.

The release also came amid rising concern in Congress that the Reagan administration's policies for combating communism in Central America could lead to a Vietnam-style war in the region.

The Intelligence Committee called Thursday's closed meeting after CIA Director William J. Casey acknowledged last week that he had not adequately briefed the panel about the agency's supervision of the mining of Nicaraguan ports.

The study, prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee by Library of Congress researchers, highlighted both similarities and differences between congressional oversight of the CIA now and in the 1950s.

"Although the agency's role in Indochina was and continued thereafter to be very active, there was virtually no effort made by Congress during this time to examine what the agency was doing or the consequences of its activities, or to exercise any control over those activities," the report said.

It quoted a 1978 finding by a Senate investigating panel that "members often preferred not knowing about agency activities" and that CIA Director Allen Dulles had "secured the absolute trust of senior ranking members" of key congressional committees.

Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee have also been criticized for failing to question the CIA sharply enough.

Casey, on the other hand, has angered influential members, including committee Chairman Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., who told him in a letter that the mining appeared to be an indefensible, warlike act.

The report on CIA oversight is part of a 365-page study, the first of four volumes, that outlines executive and legislative branch actions affecting the U.S. role in Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1961.

As early as 1945, when the United States sent 50,000 Marines to North China to hold off communist troops until Chinese Nationalist soldiers arrived to replace the withdrawing Japanese, the report said there were "objections to the deployment of U.S. forces in China from some members of Congress, primarily Democrats of liberal persuasion."

But, it said, "the continuing struggle to exclude 'politics' from foreign policy and to develop a bipartisan or non-partisan approach to foreign policy-making also had the effect of inhibiting congressional inquiry." The result was that hearings on the issue came to nothing.

Similarly in recent times, liberal Democrats have sharply criticized sending Marines to Lebanon and military aid to El Salvador, and the administration has responded by appealing for bipartisanship in foreign policy.

In a parallel with current demands for conditions on aid to El Salvador, the study noted a tendency by Congress in the late 1940s to "apply American standards to countries being considered for aid, and to propose conditioning such aid on reforms in the direction of greater democracy and more efficient government."

As in the case of the CIA's activities, the study said early requests for military aid for what was then known as French Indochina received "exceptionally strong support" from Congress, partly because of preoccupation with the war then being fought in Korea.

Mr. Terry notes in his brief introduction that black attitudes in Vietnam began to change after 1968, mainly because of events at home. The civil rights movement was gaining momentum, riots had swept through the urban ghettos, and the black replacements then going to Vietnam began to arrive with a keener awareness of their racial identity. As Mr. Terry observes, they were "fitted with a new sense of black pride and purpose," and they spoke out against discrimination in decorations, promotions and assignments.

It is worth emphasizing, though, that white soldiers in Vietnam during that period were also beginning to display signs of insubordination. Many had been influenced by the antiwar protests in the United States. President Nixon, new in office, had announced his troop-withdrawal plan, and nobody wanted to be the last man to die. Drug abuse, fraggings and other kinds of indiscipline were spreading. In short, for blacks and whites alike, Vietnam had become a lost cause that had ceased to inspire American troops, who had originally considered the commitment to be noble.

Interesting in this respect are the professions of unalloyed patriotism by the blacks Mr. Terry interviewed. "I knew Americans were prejudiced, were racist and all that," Marine Pfc. Reginald Edwards said, "but, basically, I believed in America 'cause I was an American." Or listen to Capt. Norman Alexander McDaniel, an airman shot down over North Vietnam and held prisoner in Hanoi, who refused to broadcast propaganda for the Communists: "My personal feeling is that black people have problems and still have problems in America. But I never told them that, because I had no intention of helping them to defeat us. . . . America is the black man's best hope."

Unsurprisingly, the closer blacks and whites got to combat, the more racial distinctions blurred. Arthur E. Woodley Jr., a black paratrooper, befriended a white Ku Klux Klan member from Arkansas because "once you started to go out in the field with an individual . . . you start to depend on that person." Sgt. Maj. Edgar A. Huff risked his life to save his radio operator, a white. "Hell, he was one of my men. Black or white, I would have done the same even if I got shot to hell in the process."

Every group committed atrocities in Vietnam, and  
*Continued on page 9*

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW 7

### Echoes of an Assassination

When I heard that Martin Luther King was assassinated, my first inclination was to run out and punch the first white guy I saw. I was very hurt. All I wanted to do was to go home. I even wrote Lyndon Johnson a letter. I said that I didn't understand how I could be trying to protect foreigners in their country with the possibility of losing my life wherein in my own country people who are my hero, like Martin Luther King, can't even walk the streets in a safe manner. I didn't get an answer from the President, but I got an answer from the White House. . . .

With the world focused on the King assassination

and the riots that followed in the United States, the North Vietnamese, being politically astute, schooled the Viet Cong to go on a campaign of psychological warfare against the American forces.

At the time, more blacks were dying in combat than whites, proportionately, mainly because more blacks were in combat-oriented units, proportionately, than whites. To play on the sympathy of the black soldier, the Viet Cong would shoot at a white guy, then let the black guy behind him go through, then shoot at the next white guy.

—Staff Sgt. Don E. Browne in "Bloods"

• • •  
All this leads to the question: can businessmen like Mr. Iacocca succeed in government?

I don't think Mr. Iacocca could stand the nonsense involved in running for office. But I've long believed that President Reagan should persuade his counterpart in the other party to join him in endorsing a bipartisan 15-year appointment of Felix G. Rohatyn as Secretary of Defense. Finding a *modus vivendi* between the Russians and our own military-industrial establishment without going broke is not an act, it's a career, and the savior of New York City is probably one of the few people who could pull it off. Something like that would attract the savior of Chrysler.

Bless you, Mr. Iacocca, for reminding us about right and wrong and hard work and that there are no free lunches — the "values that made this country great."

At the end of the book, Mr. Iacocca says that as a salesman he would be remiss if he didn't ask for the order before he leaves. O.K., Mr. Iacocca. As you have asked, I've sent my contribution to the Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation. □

# CLA-backed rebel group admits to executions

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — A Nicaraguan rebel leader said Saturday that it is the practice of his CIA-backed group to execute government officials who are deemed criminals. A Pentagon intelligence report informed top Reagan administration officials of such assassinations more than two years ago.

"We have taken towns and our men have had to kill officials of the Sandinista government," Edgar Chamorro, chief of propaganda for the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan Democratic Force. He said most of those executed were security officials who had "a very bad reputation" with the townspeople.

"In guerrilla war, if you have to exact justice immediately, sometimes you have to do it," he said. "We don't have jails. We are in the jungle."

He also charged that the Nicaraguan Sandinista government has killed captured rebels and rebel supporters.

The Democratic Force, known by its Spanish initials FDN, claims about 12,000 troops who have been fighting the leftist Nicaraguan government for the past three years. The largest of several CIA-supported rebel groups, the FDN is based in Honduras.

Chamorro also said a psychological warfare manual — produced by the CIA and recommending "selective use of violence" to "neutralize" officials — was distributed to rebel troops inside Nicaragua.

Chamorro, however, said he knew of no specific case in which material from the manual led directly to a killing. He also said two other parts of the manual — calling for hiring of professional criminals to carry out "selective

*'It has been our practice to kill people who are criminals who fall into our hands.'*

Rebel Edgar Chamorro

jobs" and creation of a "martyr" for the cause — were removed before most of the books were sent out.

The existence of the 90-page manual was reported a week ago, and President Reagan ordered two administration investigations into its production on Thursday. Some leading Democrats have demanded independent probes and the firing of CIA Director William J. Casey.

In announcing the investigations, the White House said the administration "has not advocated or condoned political assassination," and cited a Dec. 4, 1981 order signed by Reagan barring U.S. involvement in assassinations.

A secret Defense Intelligence Agency report, dated July 16, 1982, reported that during the preceding several months, Nicaraguan rebels had engaged in "the assassination of minor government officials and a Cuban adviser." The report linked one rebel group, the 15 September Legion, to several airline attacks and described the group as terrorist.

The information was contained in a DIA Weekly Intelligence Summary that circulates among top administration officials. Its existence was first reported on Aug. 22, 1983, after a copy was

obtained and independently verified by two U.S. government officials.

Chamorro said Saturday, "We have taken towns and our men have had to kill officials of the Sandinista government." He said such executions are by order of the local rebel commander after consultation with townspeople. The CIA manual advises calling villagers together to voice complaints against specific officials before steps are taken to neutralize them. In the manual, neutralize is not defined.

"It has been our practice to kill people who are criminals who fall into our hands," Chamorro said.

As an example, he said that in mid-December 1983, the rebels captured the town of Pantasma in northern Nicaragua and the commander executed three persons after they had been pointed out by the townspeople as criminals.

Chamorro also said the rebels have at times executed captured Nicaraguan soldiers although adding that a military code of ethics has been adopted that encourages the release of captives after they are interrogated and if they refuse to join the rebels.

The Sandinista government has often said the rebels have assassinated and kidnapped officials and townspeople sympathetic to the government when they attack villages.

According to a new study by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs — a liberal, Washington-based research group that is critical of U.S. policy in Central America — Nicaraguan rebel groups have murdered 876 civilians since 1980, with the heaviest toll occurring in 1983 when 605 civilians were slain, the group said.



## Another CIA book for rebels is probed

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Congressional intelligence committees, reviewing the CIA's psychological warfare manual for Nicaraguan rebels, also are examining the spy agency's production of a comic book-style manual that urges Nicaraguans to sabotage their leftist government.

Committee sources, who insisted on anonymity, said the CIA's preparation of the two manuals could suggest a concerted program. White House officials have portrayed the psychological warfare manual as an unauthorized product by a low-level contract employee operating in Central America.

That manual suggests "selective use of violence" to "neutralize" some Nicaraguan government officials; hiring professional criminals to carry out "selective jobs"; arranging the death of a rebel supporter to create a "martyr"; and coercing Nicaraguans into carrying out assignments.

Meanwhile, a rebel leader fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua said in Miami that the reference to "neutralization" of government officials alludes to anything from "humiliation" to assassination.

Edgar Chamorro, chief of propaganda for the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, said that sections of the manual that deal with actual killing of government officials were excised from the version distributed to rebel training camps.

Chamorro said about 2,000 copies of the manual were distributed in rebel-held border areas and that they were used to train about 500 rebels. He said about 200 copies of the earlier, unexpurgated version were printed and that they have been destroyed.

The booklet was written by an American, rebel sources told Knight-Ridder Newspapers.

The rebels said the American, who they identified as John Kirkpatrick, was a low-level contract employee of the CIA who arrived in Tegucigalpa in October 1983 and stayed two months.

Chamorro, the booklet's editor, said that only he, the American author and two guerrillas who translated the work into Spanish saw the book before its publication.

The money to produce the booklet was supplied by a Vietnam veteran, and it was printed in Honduras, Chamorro said.

In another development, a high CIA official has told congressional staff members that CIA-supported "contras" in Nicaragua have killed many middle- and lower-level Sandinistas, according to congressional sources with access to classified information.

The disclosure of the killings was made during a secret briefing late last year for senior staff members of the House Intelligence Committee.

Those killed included "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of co-operatives, nurses, doctors and judges," a source familiar with the briefing said.

But the CIA official, Dewey Claridge, former head of the CIA's clandestine operations in Latin America, insisted that such killings did not violate an executive order signed by President

Reagan forbidding political assassinations.

"After all, this is a war — a paramilitary operation," Claridge was quoted by one person who was present.

President Reagan has ordered two investigations — one by the CIA and one by the Reagan-appointed Intelligence Oversight Board — into "the possibility of improper conduct" in the manual's production.

The other manual, a 16-page sabotage booklet, called the "Freedom Fighter's Manual," encouraged Nicaraguans to call in sick to work, pour sand into engines, clog up toilets, and hurl Molotov cocktails at police stations and fuel depots.

## NATIONAL NEWS

# Mondale demands firing of Casey

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Walter Mondale demanded on Friday that President Reagan fire CIA Director William Casey before Sunday's presidential debate because of the distribution of a CIA document that encourages terrorism against the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Five days after the existence of the document became known, the Democratic challenger also called on the president to immediately explain whether he plans U.S. military action against the government in Managua.

The disclosure that the CIA produced the document "is a profound embarrassment to our country," he said.

Mondale interrupted his debate preparations to speak to reporters outside his northwest Washington home. Reagan devoted much of the day to studying for Sunday's debate on foreign policy.

But Reagan's chief campaign spokesman, James Lake, said the debate really doesn't matter.

"Walter Mondale has already lost the election," he said.

Lake said Reagan could lose only if there were some "unknown, unplanned, unexpected" event. He refused to elaborate.

In his attack on Reagan, Mondale said the president should explain how U.S.-backed rebels in Nicaragua were given instructions on how to kill local government leaders and hire criminals for acts of violence against the government.

"Did he know this was going on," said Mondale. "If he didn't know how could that possibly be. I don't know which is worse, having that go on or having a government with no one in charge so these things contrary to the public interest can go on without the knowledge of the president."

"The purpose of this illegal activity by the CIA was not to interdict supplies from the Sandinistas to the guerrillas in El Salvador," he said. "It was for the explicit purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua."

Asked if he knew of any incidents in which the actions

described in the manual were actually carried out, Mondale replied:

"This was a manual that directed people to whom it was addressed to carry out political assassination, to hire criminals and other illegal acts..." he said. "Those were the orders and the recommendations of the manual. Somebody has to be responsible for that."

"How much of that in fact happened is information I do not have," he said.

Sounding a theme likely to be heard in the 90-minute nationally televised debate, the Democratic presidential nominee said he believes that the U.S.-supported rebel effort in Nicaragua is failing.

"The forces in the Sandinista government are stronger than they were by far four years ago," he said. "If his objective is to overthrow that government, the only way it can be done is through the introduction of U.S. combat troops."

That raises the question, said Mondale, "whether this adminis-

tration plans to introduce U.S. combat troops."

"These are all questions of who's in charge, who's in command and what is this government up to," said Mondale.

"We have a right to demand that president define very clearly what his objectives are in the war and how he intends to achieve them," Mondale said, adding:

"It is the time to realize that it is the CIA itself that is in danger."

Of Casey, Mondale said, the law requires that the CIA director report illegal activities to the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

"That law was violated," he said.

So, said Mondale, Reagan should fire Casey "before the Sunday debate so we can get on with the necessary work of restoring the strength and the credibility of that crucial agency."

Asked why he waited so long to urge Casey's dismissal, Mondale said, "I was doing something I often do. I think things over."